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One Nation under Trump: More Power to
Him?
Jessica Hernandez*
This note examines the following question: to what extent has the
Trump administration heralded an expansion of presidential
trade powers with respect to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962? It proceeds by first providing an overview of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. It then looks at the Section 232
investigations which (a) preceded Trump’s assumption of office
and (b) resulted in presidential trade action. After reviewing the
aforementioned investigations, this note examines the Section
232 investigations initiated under the Trump administration.
Attention is paid to how the Trump administration has defined
‘national security’ more broadly. The implications of adopting
an expanded understanding of ‘national security’ are examined
at various points throughout this note, and the note advances the
notion that the president’s authority under Section 232 warrants
curtailment via congressional oversight. Alternatives to Section
232 duties which the United States might consider in the future
are also briefly examined. This note ultimately concludes that
although the Trump administration is not heralding an
expansion of presidential trade powers with respect to Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the broad definition of
‘national security’ adopted by it has resulted in the premature
imposition of Section 232 duties. Such misuse heightens the risk
that the international community will perceive the United States’
actions under Section 232 as having roots in protectionism as
opposed to in national security concerns.

*
Juris Doctorate Candidate 2020, University of Miami School of Law; Bachelor of Arts
2014, University of Miami.
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I. WHAT IS THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962?
In the midst of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy signed into
law the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The act was intended to facilitate
the use of trade agreements as a means to stimulate the United States’
economic growth, strengthen foreign relations, and prevent the spread of
communism.1 Kennedy’s remarks upon signing the bill encapsulated
these goals:
This act recognizes, fully and completely, that we cannot
protect our economy by stagnating behind tariff walls,
but that the best protection possible is a mutual lowering
of tariff barriers among friendly nations so that all may
benefit from a free flow of goods. Increased economic
activity resulting from increased trade will provide more
job opportunities for our workers. . . . The results can

1

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–794, § 102, 76 Stat. 872, 872 (1962).
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bring a dynamic new era of growth. . . . A vital
expanding economy in the free world is a strong counter
to the threat of the world Communist movement. This
act is, therefore, an important new weapon to advance
the cause of freedom.2
Although the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 granted the president
temporary authority to make substantial tariff cuts, it also granted the
chief of state the power to do the exact opposite.3
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“Section 232”)
enables the president to enact measures—including, but not limited to,
increasing tariffs—to adjust imports of articles deemed a threat to
national security.4 For the president to take action under Section 232, the
Secretary of Commerce must first conduct an investigation into the effect
of a given good on national security.5 The investigation may be selfinitiated; alternatively, an interested party or the head of a department or
agency may request an investigation.6 The Secretary of Commerce has
270 days after the date on which the investigation commences to submit
a report to the president on the findings.7 Only if the Secretary of
Commerce concludes that an imported good threatens national security
may the president act under Section 232. The Trade Expansion Act of
1962 grants the president ninety days to decide upon a course of
action8—and an additional fifteen days to implement it.9
Since Donald Trump assumed the presidency, the Secretary of
Commerce has initiated four Section 232 investigations.10 Although
Trump is far from the first American president to impose Section 232
duties, there are concerns that he wields tariffs in a “much more forceful
and much more coordinated fashion” than any of his predecessors,
blurring the lines separating trade policy from foreign policy in the

2

Legislative Summary: International, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND
MUSEUM,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/legislativesummary/international (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
3
See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (2012).
4
See id.
5
See id. § 1862(b).
6
Id. § 1862(b)(1)(A).
7
Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
8
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
9
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B).
10
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2019).
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process.11 Thus, questions remain as to whether the Trump
administration is heralding an expansion of presidential trade powers—as
they relate to Section 232. Securing a definitive answer, however, is
complicated by the fact that it is difficult to assess whether an
administration is exceeding its bounds when limits are not clearly
delineated; Section 232 does not define ‘national security,’ and the
legislative history is bereft of “any meaningful discussion of the
standard.”12
Despite the lack of a clear definition or standard for national
security, the text of Section 232 does present a number of factors to
consider in appraising national security, and most of them fit into one of
two classes: (1) variables pertaining to national defense and (2) variables
connected to economic welfare. Assessing national security through the
national defense lens requires that one look at factors such as:

. . . domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements, the capacity of

domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing
and anticipated availabilities of the human resources,
products, raw materials, and other supplies and services
essential to the national defense, the requirements of
growth of such industries and such supplies and services
including the investment, exploration, and development
necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of
goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities,
character, and use as those affect such industries and the
capacity of the United States to meet national security
requirements. . . .13
By contrast, evaluating national security through the economic
welfare lens necessitates looking at an entirely different set of variables,
including “the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare

Adam Taylor, No President Has Used Sanctions and Tariffs Quite Like Trump,
WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/29/nopresident-has-used-sanctions-tariffs-quite-like-trump/?utm_term=.3f3ac7163535.
12
David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign
Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. OF INT’L L.
926, 935 (1990).
13
19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2012).
11
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of individual domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment,

decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other
serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products
by excessive imports.”14
The relative importance of factors relating to national defense and
those touching upon economic welfare is not addressed in Section 232.
Nor does Section 232 state how many variables the Secretary of
Commerce must identify as having been adversely affected by foreign
imports before soundly opining that a national security threat exists.
Additionally, the considerations presented in Section 232 are not
comprehensive; the statute makes clear—via language such as “without
excluding other relevant factors”—that the lists therein are merely
illustrative.15 These gaps aid one in concluding that, notwithstanding
Trump’s improper use of Section 232 from a historical perspective,
Trump is technically acting within the letter of the law from a legal
perspective. It is this argument which this note seeks to advance: first by
detailing the actions of pre-Trump administrations, and then by looking
at the Section 232 investigations initiated under the current chief of state.

II. THE PRE-TRUMP ERA
Twenty-six Section 232 investigations were conducted during the
various pre-Trump administrations.16 Nine of them resulted in
affirmative findings by the Department of Commerce.17 In only six did
the acting president “impose[] a trade action.”18 Those six cases will be
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

A. The Petroleum Investigation of 1973
In 1959, President Dwight Eisenhower implemented the Mandatory
Oil Import Program (MOIP).19 This program created a quota system
which disallowed the importation of oil in excess of nine percent of
14

Id.
Id.
16
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 38–40.
17
See id.
18
Id.
19
Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: 1850–2017, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy (last visited Oct. 25,
2018).
15
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domestic consumption.20 MOIP essentially constituted a response to
concerning findings by the Department of Commerce regarding the fact
that “although domestic demand [for oil] grew by 216.8% from 1954 to
1958, domestic crude oil production rose only 5.8%.”21 Essentially, an
excess supply of petroleum at the international level—coupled with low
prices therein—had resulted in an increase in imports, and such an
increase “threatened the capability of the domestic suppliers to meet the
requirements of an expanding economy”22 by denying, or at the very
least severely restricting, the ability of domestic producers to grow. The
worry was that, in the event of an emergency, the United States “would
be confronted with all of the liabilities inherent in a static . . .
mobilization base, including the delays, waste and inefficiency that
accompany efforts to [strengthen] any part of the mobilization base on a
‘crash’ basis.”23 It was against the backdrop of MOIP’s eventual failure
to correct for the “imbalance” between domestic production and
petroleum imports24 that President Richard Nixon decided to initiate a
Section 232 investigation and subsequently move away from the existing
quota system in favor of a license fee system.25

B. The Petroleum Investigation of 1975
In 1973, Nixon lent his support to Israel during the Yom Kippur
War.26 Angered by Nixon’s actions, OPEC’s Arab member states
responded by enacting an embargo on petroleum exports against the
United States and its allies, heralding the OPEC Crisis.27 At the time of
the embargo, the United States’ economy relied on oil imports to meet
thirty-seven percent of its domestic consumption needs.28 The embargo
denied the United States approximately thirty-eight percent of its
imports.29 In 1975, in the wake of the OPEC crisis, President Gerald Ford

20

Id.
Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy
Framework for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 235, 244 (1990).
22
Id.
23
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., Effects of Oil Imports on National
Security, 44 Fed. Reg. 18818, 18819 (Mar. 29, 1979).
24
Bialos, supra note 21, at 245 (explaining that “oil imports continued to grow and
rose from 1.61 million bbl/d in 1960 to 6.03 million bbl/d in 1973”).
25
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 38.
26
Bialos, supra note 21, at 246.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
21
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initiated a Section 232 investigation.30 The findings of the investigation
revealed that the United States’ dependence on imported petroleum was
increasing, and this reliance “threatened to impair the national security,
foreign policy, military predominance, and economic welfare of the
United States.”31 After the Secretary of Treasury determined that there
existed a significant risk that another interruption like the OPEC Crisis
would occur,32 Ford took action under Section 232.33 He accelerated
increases in Nixon’s graduated license fees; introduced a new,
supplemental fee to be levied against every barrel of imported oil; and
reinstated certain tariffs lifted under Nixon.34

C. The Petroleum Investigation of 1978
The petroleum investigation of 1978—which concluded in 197935
and confirmed the findings of the 1959 and 1975 studies36—prompted
President Jimmy Carter to issue two proclamations. In April of 1979,
Carter issued Proclamation 4655, temporarily suspending import fees
and tariffs;37a shortage of petroleum in the international arena had driven
up prices in the oil market, and the added costs occasioned by previous
Section 232 tariffs made import fees “burdensome to the American
public.”38 Additionally, in April of 1980, Carter issued Proclamation
4744, announcing the Petroleum Import Adjustment Program (PIAP).39
At the time of the program’s enactment, the United States was importing
more than forty percent of its oil,40 and—by 1978—OPEC nations were
supplying the country with eighty-three percent of all imported oil.41 The
United States was “import[ing] and us[ing] more oil than all the other
Western industrialized nations put together.”42 When viewed in light of

30

Id.
Id. at 246–47.
32
Id. at 247.
33
Id. at 248.
34
Id.
35
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., supra note 23, at 18818.
36
See Proclamation No. 4744, 45 Fed. Reg. 22864 (Apr. 2, 1980).
37
Proclamation No. 4655, 44 Fed. Reg. 21243 (Apr. 6, 1979).
38
Id.
39
Proclamation No. 4744, supra note 36.
40
Conservation Fee on Oil Imports Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
Reporters,
THE
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/conservation-fee-oil-imports-remarks-andquestion-and-answer-session-with-reporters (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
41
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFFICE OF SEC’Y., supra note 23, at 18819.
42
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, supra note 40.
31
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the Section 232 findings discussed above, this excessive reliance on
foreign suppliers of oil was deemed a national security threat.
Interestingly, in June of 1980, Carter rescinded Proclamation 4744 after
Congress terminated the PIAP.43 PIAP’s fatal flaw was its imposition of
fees on domestic and imported petroleum alike; thus, it “could not
[possibly] act as a disincentive to reduce imports.”44

D. The Iranian Petroleum Investigation of 1979
On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants attacked the American
Embassy at Tehran, taking approximately sixty Americans hostage.45
Within twenty-four hours, several Iranian authorities—including
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who was acting as the de facto chief of
state), “the Foreign Minister, the commander of the Revolutionary
Guard, the public prosecutor, and the judiciary”—expressed their
approval of the militants’ actions.46 The hostage situation prompted
Carter to issue Proclamation 4702 on November 12, 1979, implementing
an embargo on Iranian oil.47 The proclamation came on the heels of a
memorandum from the Secretary of Treasury, in which the United
States’ reliance on Iran for oil was deemed to constitute a threat to
national security.48
The 1979 oil embargo presents a case wherein the connection
between imports and a threat to national security is clear: had the United
States continued to import oil from Iran in the midst of the hostage crisis,
it would have funded a government which had taken—and which
persisted in taking—hostile action against it. Providing Iran with a
stream of income via petroleum imports was inherently incompatible
with the goal of sending a message—both to Iran and to the international
community—that threatening the safety and wellbeing of the United
States’ citizens was unacceptable.

E. The Libyan Petroleum Investigation of 1982
In March of 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued Proclamation
4907, announcing the enactment of an embargo on petroleum from
Proclamation No. 4766, 45 Fed. Reg. 41899 (June 19, 1980).
Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
45
Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 418, 427 (1980).
46
Id.
47
Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65581 (Nov. 12, 1979).
48
Id.
43
44
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Libya.49 In his proclamation, Reagan explicitly stated that the “policy
and action supported by revenues from the sale of oil imported into the
United States [from Libya were] inimical to . . . national security.”50 The
actions and policies referred to by Reagan likely included Libya’s overt
support of terrorism,51 its alignment with Palestine in the territorial
dispute between Israelis and Palestinians,52 and its tendency to render aid
to governments or movements black-listed by Washington.53
The relationship between petroleum imports and national security in
this case is similar to that in the case of Iran: the president may have
concluded that the United States would indirectly fund activities adverse
to itself, its people, or its allies absent an embargo. Given that Libya was
“widely perceived as the world’s strongest supporter of terrorism” during
the 1980’s, that conclusion was not without merit.54

F. The Metal-Cutting and Metal-Forming Machine Tools
Investigation of 1983
In 1983, representatives from the ferroalloy industry, the metal
fastener industry, and the machine tool industry sought the
implementation of favorable protective measures under Section 232; they
claimed that the existence of their industries was integral to national
security.55 The subsequent investigation revealed that the aforementioned
industries indeed faced problems domestically.56 For instance, with
respect to the metal fastener industry, the United States imported nearly
“two-thirds of the nuts, bolts, and large screws needed to hold together
virtually all types of military equipment” by 1982.57 Despite the
foregoing, the Department of Commerce opined that such a situation did
not indicate the presence of a national security threat.58 Rather, it argued
that the following factors warranted examination: (i) whether the
exporting countries were politically reliable, (ii) whether any shipping
Proclamation No. 4907, 47 Fed. Reg. 10507 (Mar. 10, 1982).
Id.
51
See Lisa Anderson, Rogue Libya’s Long Road, 241 MIDDLE E. REP. 42, 43 (2006).
52
Yahia H. Zoubir, Libya in US Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?,
23 THIRD WORLD Q. 31, 32 (2002).
53
Id.
54
Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent, 101
AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 553 (2007).
55
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Strategic Implications of Relative Economic Decline, 104
POL. SCI. Q. 401, 418 (1989).
56
See id. at 419.
57
Id.
58
Id.
49
50
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losses incurred would prove minimal, and (iii) whether, if the suppliers
were unable to access necessary raw materials, said suppliers would be
able to “obtain sufficient quantities of suitable-grade steel from the
United States.”59 Answering these inquiries in the negative did not create
a per se presumption of a national threat; rather, it indicated that there
was a possibility that delays and shortages could ensue.60 Ultimately,
after conducting its investigation, the Department of Commerce elected
not to recommend that the president act pursuant to the powers granted
under Section 232.61 Instead, Reagan utilized avenues unrelated to
Section 232 to offer aid where proper. For instance, the Department of
Commerce’s reports led to “a decision in 1984 to increase stockpiles of
some ferroalloys.”62 Additionally—with regard to the machine tools
industry—the Reagan administration sought Voluntary Restraint
Agreements (beginning in 1986) with various suppliers.63

III. KEY POINTS FROM PRE-TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
INVESTIGATIONS
Taking action under Section 232 has often been regarded as “the
nuclear option in trade law.”64 Thus, this note proposes that the following
factors deserve thoughtful consideration before resorting to Section 232
tariffs: (a) whether there is a significantly contentious relationship with
an exporting state, (b) whether, under a hypothetical deterioration in the
working relationship between the importer and a given exporter, the
former’s ability to securely procure the imported good elsewhere
(including internally) would be significantly compromised, and (c)
whether the circumstances are such that in the event of a national
emergency, the state would not be able to adequately meet the needs of
the Defense Department. Applying the proffered framework can enhance

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 419 n.66.
64
Noah Glazier, Legal Framework and Economic Critique: Trump's Trade Authority
and Policy. A Look at the Legality, Practicality, Probability, and Rationality of President
Trump's Proposed Trade-Related Action, 14 S.C. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 27, 42 (2017)
(quoting Doug Palmer & Matthew Nussbaum, Trump puts aluminum imports in ‘national
(Apr.
26,
2017,
9:25
PM),
security’
crosshairs,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/26/trump-aluminum-imports-trade-237665).
60
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one’s understanding of why prior administrations imposed Section 232
duties in the petroleum cases but not in the 1983 case.
In the 1983 case, the main exporting countries included Japan,
Taiwan, and India—none of which the United States had a significantly
contentious relationship with at the time.65 Moreover, states like Iran and
Libya differed from Japan, Taiwan, and India in a fundamental way.
Unlike the latter, the former had taken actions diametrically opposed to
significant interests of the United States shortly before the imposition of
duties, and they formed part of an organization that controlled a
substantial amount of the international oil supply.66 Concerns that one
OPEC member’s decision to stop supplying the United States could set
off a domino effect were likely far from non-issues, and given the
inability of the United States’ domestic industries to compensate for
supply disruptions, the threat of a domino effect would have qualified as
a compelling one. By contrast, during the 1983 Section 232
investigation, the United States presumably determined either that its
domestic industries would successfully mobilize and make up for any
supply disruptions or that other suppliers could reliably fulfill this
objective.

IV. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Having examined several Section 232 investigations initiated during
pre-Trump administrations, one should next consider investigations
commenced under the Trump administration.

See Lou Cannon, Reagan, Nakasone Discuss Trade in Tokyo, WASH. POST (Nov. 10,
1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/10/reagan-nakasonediscuss-trade-in-tokyo/5ea4a87f-a634-4f99-991c-2edbda7cdf80/ (making reference to the
“friendly relations between Japan and the United States”); WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS
SECRETARY, Joint Communique of the United States of America and The Peoples
Republic of China, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Aug. 17, 1982),
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00551R0002000100034.pdf (highlighting the United States’ commitment to maintaining “cultural, commercial,
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan,” and acknowledging that the
United States had sold arms to Taiwan and would continue to do so); U.S.-India
Relations 1947–2019, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-indiarelations (last visited Dec. 13, 2019) (identifying the year 1982 as a watershed in U.S.Indian relations, for President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Indira Ghandi agreed
to “increase cooperation and resolve a dispute over nuclear power”).
66
John Tagliabue, OPEC Talks Expected to Focus on Production, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
21, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/21/business/opec-talks-expected-to-focuson-production.html (identifying Iran and Libya as OPEC members in 1983).
65
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A. The Steel Investigation of 2017
In March of 2018, President Donald Trump issued Proclamation
9705, announcing the imposition of a “25 percent ad valorem tariff on
steel articles . . . imported from all countries except Canada and
Mexico.”67 Trump’s decision to take action against steel imports under
Section 232 is significant. It marked the first time in nearly thirty-five
years that presidential action (in the form of imposing a tariff, duty, or
fee) was taken under Section 232.68 Also, the decision marked the first
time that action was taken under Section 232 against an import other than
petroleum.69 As per Trump, the duties were enacted in response to a
national security threat occasioned by a weakening of the country’s
internal economy (precipitated, in turn, by “global excess capacity for
producing steel”) and a “shrinking of [the United States’] ability to meet
national security production requirements in a national emergency.”70
Thus, put more concisely, Trump credited national defense needs and the
county’s economic wellbeing with motivating his decision to impose
duties under Section 232.
Viewed in the context of the six Section 232 investigations discussed
in the preceding sections, though, how appropriate is it to maintain that
steel imports pose a national security threat? In answering this question,
it is helpful to employ the three-pronged test proposed earlier; said test
synthesizes multiple salient factors explicitly and implicitly considered
by previous administrations.
The first factor to consider is whether there exists a significantly
contentious relationship with an exporting state. In descending order, the
top twenty countries from which the United States imports steel are
Canada, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Germany,
Taiwan, India, China, Vietnam, the Netherlands, Italy, Thailand, Spain,
the United Kingdom, South Africa, Sweden, and the United Arab
Emirates.71 None of these countries recently engaged in openly hostile
action—comparable in gravity, for instance, to Iran taking American

Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625, 11626 (Mar. 8, 2018).
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 10, at 39–40.
69
See id. at 38–40.
70
Proclamation No. 9705, supra note 67.
71
The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended, BUREAU OF INDUS.
AND SEC. OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (Jan. 11, 2018), at 28,
https://agoa.info/images/documents/15373/theeffectofimportsofsteelonthenationalsecurity
-withredactions-20180111.pdf.
67
68
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hostages in 1979 or to Libya’s government openly sponsoring terrorism
in the 1980s—against the interests of the United States.
Second, one must determine whether the deterioration in the working
relationship between the United States and a given exporter would
significantly compromise the former’s ability to securely procure the
imported good elsewhere (including internally). Because the United
States imports steel from such a long list of countries, and because the
lower eighteen of these countries collectively supply approximately twothirds of the United States’ total steel imports (with no state individually
supplying more than ten percent of said total),72 it is unlikely that a
breakdown in one working relationship will significantly compromise
other relationships—especially given the fact that steel-producing states
are not members to an organization akin to OPEC, wherein the threat of a
domino effect looms heavily.
Lastly, it is necessary to assess whether circumstances are such that,
in the event of a national emergency requiring mobilization of the
military, the United States would not be able to adequately meet the
needs of the Defense Department. Domestic production more than
adequately meets the steel requirements of the United States military.73
Such steel requirements “represent about three percent of U.S.
production,”74 meaning that the United States produces enough steel to
meet the military’s needs thirty times over. Furthermore, the United
States has reciprocal defense arrangements—which afford it protection
both in the event of an attack abroad and in the event of an attack on its
own soil—with four of its top ten suppliers: Canada (via the North
Atlantic Treaty), Brazil (via the Rio Treaty), Turkey (via the North
Atlantic Treaty), and Germany (via the North Atlantic Treaty).75
Collectively, these four states provide the United States with thirty-nine
percent of its imported steel.76 Thus, if—in an emergency occasioned by
an attack—the United States required a continued supply of steel to meet

72

See id.
See John Brinkley, Trump’s National Security Tariffs Have Nothing To Do With
National
Security,
FORBES
(Mar.
12,
2018,
11:41
A.M.),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/03/12/trumps-national-security-tariffshave-nothing-to-do-with-national-security/#3d585902706c.
74
Id.
75
See U.S. Collective Defense Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190805151941/https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019).
76
See OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., supra note 71.
73
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actual threats, the United States might be able to utilize its agreements
with these countries to its advantage.
The foregoing analysis suggests that—despite claims to the
contrary—the circumstances do not warrant a finding that steel imports
threaten national security by infringing on the United States’ ability to
meet national defense needs. The next question to address is whether
steel imports threaten national security by adversely affecting the United
States’ economic wellbeing.
Interestingly, some facts highlighted in the Department of
Commerce’s investigative report include the following: in the
international arena, no country imports more steel than the United States;
the United States imports almost four times as much steel as it exports;
since 1998, there has been a thirty-five percent decrease in domestic
employment in the steel industry; since 2009, the domestic steel industry
has operated on a negative net income; since 2010, the United States has
charged more for hot-rolled steel coil—a common type of steel that often
has its price regarded as a “benchmark price indicator”—than other states
have; since 2000, four electric arc furnace facilities shuttered up, while
more than twenty-five percent of the United States’ basic oxygen furnace
facilities have been lost; and American steel producers have found that
they are unable to compete with foreign producers.77
Although it has been gradually increasing, the import penetration of
steel is at a mere 33.8%—meaning that the United States produces nearly
seventy percent of the steel it consumes.78 How is one to reconcile the
assertion that importing 33.8% of consumed steel threatens the internal
economy with the 1983 finding that importing nearly twice as many
“nuts, bolts, and large screws needed to hold together virtually all types
of military equipment” does not?79 Moreover, a substantial increase in
jobs is unlikely to result from the imposed tariffs. One major reason why
jobs in domestic steel production have declined is attributable to
advances in productivity.80 Whereas it took 10.1 hours to produce a
single ton of steel in 1980, it required 2.0 hours to accomplish the same
feat in 2016.81
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Admittedly, it is concerning that the domestic steel industry is
operating on a negative net income; this challenges its very viability.82
Exacerbating such troubles is the fact that—reflecting “higher taxes,
healthcare, environmental standards, and other regulatory measures,” as
well as state-subsidization of steel production in other countries—the
United States charges more for steel than other states do,83 and its steel
producers continue to lose bids on domestic projects.84 Although
resorting to Section 232 measures may seem like an ideal way to level
the playing field and allow the United States’ steel industry to become
competitive, Section 232 duties come with a hefty price tag.
Overall, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is
consistent with international obligations. In relevant part, Article XXI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) reads as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable
materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war
or other emergency in international relations . . .85
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Trade Expansion Act provides
fertile grounds for retaliation. For instance, a number of countries have
responded to the United States’ Section 232 duties under Trump by
increasing tariffs on American goods. Canada is doing so with steel and
aluminum—among other products86—and the European Union has
elected to place extra duties on goods to immediately rebalance €2.8
billion worth of exports, with an additional €3.6 billion worth of exports
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set to be rebalanced over the next few years.87 Other countries which
have retaliated with increased tariffs include Mexico, China, India,
Japan, Russia, and Turkey.88 Their targeted products range from bourbon
whiskey and powdered cheese89 to golf cars and motorcycles.90
Interestingly, the current trade war is reminiscent of one which
unfolded during the 1960s. After the Second World War, the United
States transitioned to factory farming, enabling it to supply mass
quantities of poultry not only to domestic consumers but abroad as
well.91 Countries like France and Germany responded by placing tariffs
on chicken imported from the United States.92 While this had the
intended effect of reducing the amount of American chicken exports, it
also led President Lyndon Johnson to respond with tariffs of his own:
Johnson imposed duties at a rate of twenty-five percent on potato starch,
dextrin, brandy, and light trucks—all of which the United States
imported from Europe in large numbers.93 Thereafter, “Volkswagen
AG’s pickup and van business collapsed in the United States, and
demand for French brandy began to dry up.”94
That the consequences of the Section 232 duties on steel will mirror
those of the chicken tax—albeit in reverse, with the United States’
businesses crumbling abroad—is quite possible. Equally possible is the
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chance that trading partners will imitate Trump and attempt to block the
United States’ market access by pointing to national security concerns.95
The effects of Trump’s Section 232 duties will likely be felt
domestically, too. Industries which use steel in manufacturing will have
to contend with the increased prices. Executives in impacted industries
will undoubtedly elect to pass these additional costs to consumers, who
may then respond by lowering their demand for affected products.

B. The Aluminum Investigation of 2017
In March of 2018, Trump issued Proclamation 9704, introducing “a
10 percent ad valorem tariff on aluminum articles . . . imported from all
countries except Canada and Mexico.”96 Trump indicated that aluminum
imports threatened national security by negatively impacting national
defense and the state’s economic wellbeing.97
Viewed against the backdrop of pre-Trump Section 232
investigations, can it be argued that aluminum imports pose a national
security threat, as far as national defense is concerned? Again, it is
appropriate to look to the three-pronged test proposed earlier.
To begin with, there is no significantly contentious relationship with
an exporting state. In descending order, the top sixteen states from which
the United States imports aluminum are Canada, Russia, United Arab
Emirates, China, Bahrain, Argentina, South Africa, India, Qatar,
Venezuela, Indonesia, Mexico, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil.98
None of these countries have recently engaged in openly hostile action
such that the United States would be rendering itself vulnerable—from a
security standpoint—if it persisted in trading with them.
Moreover, the deterioration in the working relationship between the
United States and a given exporter would not significantly compromise
the former’s ability to securely procure the imported good elsewhere.
With the exception of Canada, no country provides the United States
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with more than eleven percent of its total aluminum imports.99 Hence, it
is unlikely that the severing of ties with any one state will significantly
jeopardize the United States’ access to aluminum.
Finally, present circumstances are such that in the event of a national
emergency, the United States would be able to adequately meet the needs
of the Defense Department. The import penetration of aluminum is
ninety-one percent100—meaning that the United States only produces
nine percent of the aluminum it consumes. However, as was true with
steel, the United States’ military requirements necessitate an allocation of
merely three percent of total domestic aluminum production to
defense.101 Additionally, the United States has reciprocal defense
agreements with Canada and Germany via the North Atlantic Treaty, and
with Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela via the Rio Treaty.102 Combined,
these states provide nearly fifty percent of the United States’ total
imported aluminum.103 In the event of a crisis induced by an attack, the
United States could conceivably exploit these agreements to address
material aluminum shortages.
The preceding paragraphs suggest that, had the current state of
affairs been subjected to a purely pre-Trump-administration analysis, the
government would not have concluded that aluminum imports threaten
national defense. Communications at the federal level support this
assertion. For instance, in a memorandum authored by Secretary of
Defense James Mattis for Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Mattis
explained that the United States’ production capabilities adequately
satisfied military requirements.104 The fact that Mattis nonetheless used
his memorandum to declare that unfair trade practices involving steel and
aluminum could threaten national security necessitates discussing the
extent to which aluminum imports adversely affect the United States’
economic wellbeing.
At first blush, the most compelling finding that aluminum imports
threaten the country’s economic wellbeing concerns employment.
Between 2013 and 2016, fifty-eight percent of jobs in the primary
aluminum sector were lost “as several smelters were either permanently
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shut down or temporarily idled.”105 Disconcerting though this finding
may seem, the described decline represents a loss of only 7,408 jobs, and
several
other
aluminum
sectors—including
secondary
production/alloying,
sheet/plate/foil/extrusion/coatings,
foundries,
forgings, and metal service centers—seemingly made up for this
diminution by making available thousands of new jobs, thereby resulting
in an overall employment increase of three percent in the aluminum
industry as a whole.106 Thus, contribution to the unemployment rate
cannot, in and of itself, be cited as the reason that the loss of certain
aluminum manufacturing jobs creates a national security threat. Rather,
as Trump explained in Proclamation 9704, there is growing concern that
the continued closure of aluminum production facilities will cause the
United States to rely entirely on foreign powers to (a) meet existing
needs and (b) respond to emergencies wherein an increase in the
production of aluminum is required.107 Trump’s chosen remedy—Section
232 duties—raises a number of issues. First, as was true of the Section
232 duties imposed on steel, increasing tariffs on aluminum introduces
the risk of retaliation by the United States’ trading partners. For reasons
previously discussed in the context of the chicken tax, this might
essentially culminate in the sacrificing of multiple industries to save
merely one. Moreover, the Section 232 duties are unnecessary. As per
Jeff Bialos—former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial
Affairs—the idea that the United States would suddenly need to increase
metal production to replace damaged tanks (and the like) is antiquated
thinking.108 Although such concerns were valid during the times of the
Second World War, today’s wars center on “qualitative superiority, not
quantitative superiority.”109 Concurring that the need to increase steel and
aluminum production during wartime is a nonissue, Andrew Hunter—
former chief of staff to Ash Carter, who served as Secretary of Defense
from 2015 to 2017—explains that because the market for steel and
aluminum is so robust, the Department of Defense’s supply of these
goods is not vulnerable to disruptions.110
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C. The Vehicle and Automobile Parts Investigation of 2018
In May of 2018, the Secretary of Commerce—acting under the
direction of the Trump administration—launched a Section 232
investigation into the effects of the importation of automobiles and
automotive parts on national security.111
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Trump
administration initiated the vehicle and automobile parts investigation as
part of its plan to institute changes not only in the auto industry but also
in the domain of international trade.112 Namely, the administration aimed
to accomplish the following: “(1) expand[] domestic auto manufacturing
and domestic content in autos; (2) address[] bilateral trade deficits; and
(3) reduc[e] disparities in U.S. and trading partner tariff rates.”113 Likely
motivating the first of these goals was the fact that between 1992 and
2018, the number of foreign-owned auto manufacturing plants located in
the United States grew from seven to seventeen.114 Moreover, the number
of imported vehicles—as a percentage of total sales in the United
States—increased from forty-one percent in 2010 to forty-eight percent
in 2017.115
Furthermore, as far as the second goal of the Trump administration is
concerned, some speculated that the threat of Section 232 duties was
being used “to create U.S. leverage for ongoing and future negotiations”
unrelated to automotive imports.116 For instance, in conjunction with
talks concerning the proposed trade agreement between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada, the Trump administration issued letters to
Mexico and Canada wherein it expressed that both states would benefit
from exemptions to any Section 232 duties relating to automobiles and
automotive parts.117 Similarly, after the United States and Japan agreed to
enter into trade negotiations, the Trump administration announced (in
September of 2018) that it would not impose Section 232 duties on
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Japan.118 The United States made a comparable promise to the European
Union as the two parties conducted trade negotiations.119
Undoubtedly influencing the third of the administration’s goals was
the understanding that—with respect to at least some vehicles—the
United States imposes tariffs which are significantly lower than those of
its trading partners.120 For instance, whereas the United States has a 2.5%
tariff on passenger automobiles, the European Union has tariffs of ten
percent.121 Overall, Trump wanted to address this incongruity by raising
tariffs on all imported automobiles and automobile parts to twenty-five
percent.122
On May 17, 2019, Trump issued Proclamation 9888.123 In it, he
stated that the Secretary of Commerce had concluded that (i)
“automobiles and certain automobile parts [were] being imported into the
United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security of the United States,” (ii) imports
[were] “weakening our internal economy,” and (iii) “[the] contraction of
the American-owned automotive industry, if continued, [would]
significantly impede the United States’ ability to develop technologically
advanced products that are essential to our ability to maintain
technological superiority to meet defense requirements and cost effective
global power projection.”124 Rather than impose tariffs, however, Trump
elected to direct the United States Trade Representative, Robert E.
Lighthizer, to pursue agreements with the European Union, Japan, “and
any other country the Trade Representative deem[ed] appropriate” to
“address the threatened impairment of national security.”125 Lighthizer
had to report back within 180 days.126 If the United States had not
entered into an agreement within 180 days of Proclamation 9888’s
issuance—or if it entered into an agreement which proved ineffective or
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was not carried out—the President could take other actions to adjust
imports, including the imposition of tariffs.127
On November 14, 2019, the 180-day period came to an end.128
Because Trump had not imposed Section 232 tariffs by then, his ability
to do so prospectively is now severely circumscribed.129 Had Trump
elected to resort to sanctions, he would have faced an interesting
predicament. To implement Section 232 duties without running afoul of
international obligations, Trump would have had to show that the
increasing of tariffs constituted an action which the United States opined
necessary “for the protection of its essential security interests . . . relating
to the traffic in . . . implements of war” or “for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment”; the other exceptions outlined in the GATT did
not apply.130 Proclamation 9888, however, does not intimate that vehicle
and automobile parts imports have had an adverse effect on the traffic of
implements of war, nor did it suggest that they have interfered with the
United States’ ability to supply its military. Rather, Proclamation 9888
primarily focuses on the effects of such imports on research and
development of key automotive technologies.

D. The Uranium Ore and Products Investigation of 2018
In January of 2018, Ur-Energy USA Inc. (“Ur-Energy”) and Energy
Fuel Resources (USA) Inc. (“Energy Fuel Resources”)—two of five
uranium miners in the United States—filed a petition requesting the
initiation of a Section 232 investigation into the effects of uranium
imports on national security.131 Petitioners sought to have twenty-five
percent of the domestic market for uranium reserved for American
companies.132 They framed their request as necessary for national
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defense purposes—and thus, national security purposes—claiming that
the United States’ military requires uranium to build nuclear weapons, to
fuel nuclear reactors, and to produce tritium.133 Petitioners further alleged
that international treaties prevent the United States from procuring
uranium from foreign parties for any of the aforementioned purposes.134
Thus, the United States needs to maintain a degree of self-sufficiency
where uranium production is concerned.
Although petitioners refer to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, they seemingly fail to acknowledge the differences
between the obligations imposed on nuclear-weapon states (“NWS”) and
non-nuclear-weapon states (“NNWS”). With regard to NWS, the treaty
provides as follows:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.135
Importantly, this article does not bar a NWS from transferring
materials for use in nuclear weapons or devices. There is evidence in the
remainder of the treaty’s text to suggest that this omission was made
purposely. Had the authors of the treaty wanted to restrict NWS from
trading in materials, they would have explicitly stated so, just as they did
when addressing NNWS:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes to accept safeguards . . . for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty . . . . Procedures
for the safeguards required by this article shall be
followed with respect to source or special fissionable
133

Petition for Relief Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 from
Imports of Uranium Products that Threaten National Security, supra note 131, at 76–78.
134
Id. at 77.
135
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. I, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.

166

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:143

material . . . . The safeguards required by this article
shall be applied to all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried
out under its control anywhere.136
Because uranium is neither a weapon nor a device, NWSs are not
precluded from transferring it. According to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, NWSs are those states which “manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1
January 1967.”137 Only five countries fall into this category: the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now the Russian
Federation), France, and China.138 Thus—contrary to claims made by UrEnergy and Energy Fuel Resources—the United States is not limited to
solely using domestically-produced uranium to meet its military needs. It
can import uranium for military use from any NWS.
Additionally, nuclear experts have determined that the United States’
military could rely on uranium stockpiles in the event of an
emergency.139 The United States also has enough uranium to fuel its
naval reactors through the year 2060, and—although the state previously
predicted that it would exhaust the uranium set aside for tritium
production by 2027—the Department of Energy has now identified
actions which will enable tritium production to use existing reserves until
sometime between 2038 and 2041 (or possibly later).140 As for the
construction of nuclear weapons, because the United States is presently
laboring towards reducing the number of nuclear warheads available
globally, “there is little need for uranium imports for U.S. nuclear
weapons.”141
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In their petition, Ur-Energy and Energy Fuel Resources further argue
that the domestic uranium mining industry must be properly maintained
to ensure (a) that the United States does not become vulnerable to
manipulation by states like Russia, which has a state-funded uranium
mining industry and uses its nuclear capabilities to influence foreign
policy, (b) that the United States preserves a sense of energy security and
independence, and (c) that the United States sustains its research and
development programs.142 Ultimately, the United States can rely on
NNWSs to meet most—if not all—of its non-military needs. The United
States currently obtains slightly over half of its total imported uranium
from Australia and Canada.143 Although it cannot use this uranium to fuel
nuclear reactors or build nuclear weapons, it can use such uranium to
meet the fuel needs of its space fuel reactors, isotope production reactors,
and research reactors.
For the United States to retain the ability to satisfy its military needs
without relying wholly on other NWS’s after it exhausts current reserves,
it must ensure not only the continued existence of its uranium mining
industry, but also that said industry remains in good health. Petitioners
imply that the actions of other state actors are making this difficult.
Because some countries—a number of which subsidize their uranium
mining industries—are able to sell uranium at lower prices than the
United States, the American uranium mining industry is becoming
increasingly less competitive.144 Whether this amounts to a national
security, however, is debatable.
On April 14, 2019, the Secretary of Commerce transmitted to Trump
his report on the investigation into the effects of uranium ore and
products on the United States’ national security. The Secretary opined
that “uranium is being imported into the United States in such quantities
and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security of the United States as defined under section 232 of the Act.”145
However, Trump did not concur; he explained that although “the
142
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Secretary’s findings raise significant concerns regarding the impact of
uranium imports on the national security with respect to domestic mining
. . . a fuller analysis of national security considerations with respect to the
entire nuclear fuel supply chain is necessary at this time.”146 Thus,
Trump elected not to impose Section 232 tariffs on uranium ore and
products.

V. PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS VERSUS THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 recognizes that national security is
tied to both national defense and economic welfare. Nonetheless, in the
Section 232 investigations that resulted in the undertaking of presidential
trade action, pre-Trump administrations generally focused on matters
pertaining to national defense in determining whether given imports
posed a national security threat. They did not place economic
considerations at the forefront of their discussions. The Trump
administration, by contrast, seemingly places economic welfare on equal
footing with national defense. Although doing so does not violate the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, it constitutes a shift away from the “very
narrow, technical” reading of ‘national security’ which characterized
previous Section 232 investigations.147 The succeeding considers whether
such broadening poses a separation-of-powers problem.
As was mentioned earlier, Section 232 duties are regarded as the
nuclear option in the trade world.148 Comparing Section 232 tariffs to a
nuclear weapon underscores the notion that implementing them is best
left as a course of last resort. The manner in which the Trump
administration broadly construes threats to national security, however,
has seemingly resulted in the premature use of Section 232 duties.
Because of the significant consequences attached to such tariffs, misuse
is not to be taken lightly. Misuse raises concerns that the nation’s
interests might be better served by placing limits on the president’s
unilateral trade powers. Curtailment of this sort is not unprecedented.
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During the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford administrations initiated a
system of price controls on petroleum in response to a sudden increase in
fuel prices precipitated by OPEC.149 Although the controls kept the price
of oil low in the United States and saved consumers between five and
twelve billion dollars a year, they accomplished this at a great cost.150
Because gas stations could not raise prices, global increases in oil prices
led to reductions in the amount of foreign oil purchased by American
companies.151 This caused a shortage of an estimated 1.4 million barrels
of oil per day.152 Gas stations which previously remained perpetually
open began closing mere hours after opening; a few hours was all that
they needed to sell out of gas.153 The oil scarcity caused a panic and
forced consumers to sit for hours in lines to ensure that they secured
gas.154
When the Iranian oil crisis unfolded in 1979, global oil prices
skyrocketed, worsening the energy situation in the United States.155
Fistfights broke out at gas stations shortly thereafter.156 Recognizing their
unsustainable nature, Carter elected to phase out price controls between
1979 and 1981.157 Opining that the significant increases in the price of oil
(resulting from the ability of American companies to charge market
prices) constituted “an appropriate object of taxation,”158 Congress
passed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act in 1980.
Section 402 of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act (“Section
402”) amended the Tax Expansion Act of 1962 by allowing Congress—
via a joint resolution—to render void any presidential action taken under
Section 232 “to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum products.”159
Although the president may veto the resolution, a two-thirds vote by
Congress can override the veto.160 A report authored by the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation elucidates the possible rationale underlying
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Section 402’s inclusion in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act. The report
explains that, “[o]wing to the importance of all forms of energy to our
economy, Congress believed that an orderly and specific procedure
should be established for reviewing Presidential actions taken to adjust
oil imports.”161 Additionally, Congress may have harbored concerns that
subjecting domestic industries to excessive taxation could have adversely
affected the economic welfare of the nation. If, for instance, owners of
American gas stations had to contend not only with taxes attributable to
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act but also with tariffs imposed on
the foreign oil they imported, it is quite feasible that gas station owners
would have responded by simply raising their prices until “domestic [oil]
prices [rose] even higher than the world price.”162
Interestingly, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act includes a
phaseout provision.163 The Act stipulates the removal of the imposed
taxes during a thirty-three month period beginning no later than
December of 1990.164 Section 402, however, does not have an expiration
date.165 It is still in effect. Bearing in mind that presidents imposed
Section 232 duties exclusively on petroleum imports prior to the Trump
administration—and assuming that Congress believed that presidents yet
to come would continue to use Section 232 duties to adjust petroleum
imports—to what extent can it be argued that a desire to restore its
Article I powers motivated Congress to make Section 402 outlive the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act? The Constitution grants Congress the
authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” and the Trade
Expansion Act undeniably infringes upon that right. Thus, it is
conceivable that—in part—Congress intended to use Section 402 to
curtail the president’s ability to act unilaterally in a domain wherein it
typically received starring credit. Nevertheless, regardless of Congress’
aim, the effects of Section 402 are the same: the provision breathed
congressional oversight into Section 232, and it aiding in partly restoring
the balance of powers contemplated by the Constitution. With the Trump
administration heralding the first-ever use of Section 232 duties to adjust
imports of goods other than petroleum, perhaps the time has come to
amend the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 yet again to extend
congressional oversight to Section 232 duties levied against nonpetroleum goods.
161
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During 2018, lawmakers introduced a number of bills to “take back”
from the executive branch the power to regulate foreign commerce.166
Senator Bob Corker notably proposed predicating the president’s ability
to impose Section 232 duties on congressional approval.167 Overall,
Corker’s bill has garnered the greatest support,168 and were it to pass, it
would circumscribe the president’s trade powers more so than does
Section 402; Corker’s bill would function as a complete prohibition
absent an expressed green light from Congress.169 Because of the severe
restrictions inherent in such a proposal, it is possible that the bill will fail
to gain presidential favor—and given that Section 232 functions as a
means of enhancing the country’s safety, executive disapproval of
Corker’s bill would not come as a surprise.
One might posit that increasing the likelihood of obtaining the
president’s stamp of approval on legislation limiting the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 requires crafting a bill modeled after Section 402,
which succeeded in passing muster with the legislative and executive
branches—albeit under a different administration. Such a bill, however,
would create the presumption that the imposition of Section 232 duties is
valid unless Congress says otherwise. Bearing in mind the oftentimes
adverse consequences associated with increasing duties, is it not
preferable to have a statute which creates the opposite presumption: that
the invocation of Section 232 duties is temporary unless Congress
decides otherwise? A statute requiring approval of the president’s trade
actions under Section 232 (within a given number of days of their
undertaking, as opposed to prior to implementation as Corker suggests)
would accomplish just that. More importantly, it would reinforce the
constitutionally endowed hegemony of the legislative branch where
regulating commerce with foreign nations is concerned.
Ultimately, because the legality of Section 232 duties would lapse
only if Congress failed to agree with the president’s trade actions, the
hypothetical bill considered in this note would afford the president a
considerable degree of latitude in taking swift action to address threats to
national security. Hence, it might be perceived as a relatively fair means
of reconciling Congress’ constitutional powers with the authority vested
in the president by the legislature—similar to how the War Powers
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Resolution of 1973 aided in reconciling Congress’ power to declare war
with the president’s status as commander-in-chief.170

VI. SECTION 232 DUTIES: “PLAN Z”
Misusing or resorting to Section 232 duties prematurely can heighten
the risk that the international community will perceive a given
administration’s actions as having roots in protectionism as opposed to
national security. This, in turn, might increase the likelihood that other
countries will challenge the United States’ conduct in an international
forum, or that the United States’ trading partners will retaliate. Hence, it
is imperative that—whenever possible—administrations first attempt to
remedy damages stemming from foreign imports by availing themselves
of alternatives to Section 232 duties.
One existing avenue is the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”)
dispute settlement mechanism. Amongst possible claims it could bring,
the United States might benefit from alleging that certain WTO member
states have violated Article VI of the GATT (which prohibits dumping)
and Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (which disallows subsidies). The United States has made
ample use of the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism in the past. Of the
more than 577 disputes brought to the WTO since 1995,171 the United
States has initiated 131 complaints.172 Admittedly, there is the possibility
that challenging a state’s WTO compliance will occasionally prove
fruitless. For instance, in 2017, the Obama administration requested to
enter into consultations with China, claiming that the Chinese
government provided subsidies to aluminum producers.173 One year
later—merely two months before Trump announced the imposition of
Section 232 duties on aluminum—consultations still had not occurred.174
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It is thus not surprising why some think Trump is justified in taking
action against aluminum imports under Section 232. Curiously, however,
the United States did not request consultations with China to resolve the
government’s alleged unfair trade practices as they relate to steel.175 This
omission is relevant given that the Secretary of Commerce specifically
identified China as one of the countries responsible for adversely
affecting the United States’ steel industry.176 The fact that consultations
to address the subsidization of Chinese aluminum failed to take place
does not excuse the Trump administration for this lapse; to hold
otherwise is to overlook the scores of times that the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanism successfully resulted in or facilitated conflict
resolution. Consequently, the United States’ decision to forego
requesting consultations with China to challenge its trade practices
concerning steel represents but one example of the Trump administration
underutilizing the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism.177
Instead of, or in addition to, pursuing existing alternatives to Section
232 duties, the United States might consider reforming the international
system. Specifically, the United States should push the WTO to adopt an
anti-circumvention agreement; such an agreement would consist of rules
prohibiting members from taking deliberate measures to illegally get
around, or circumvent, antidumping and countervailing duties.
Presently, the United States has “extensive antidumping and
countervailing duties” on steel imported from China.178 However, in a
number of cases, China has succeeded in avoiding these tariffs by
building plants abroad.179 Although the United States has anti-
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circumvention legislation, China’s actions do not fall within its scope.180
To make an international agreement on anti-circumvention palatable to
as many states as possible, its terms should be restricted to the most
egregious instances of circumvention, such as when a state opens up
shop abroad, or when goods are shipped to another country and sold
from there without first undergoing substantial transformation in the
second country. Overall, an international anti-circumvention agreement
is desirable because there are circumstances under which not even
Section 232 duties provide a sufficient remedy after a target state
succeeds in avoiding anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The
inadequacy of Section 232 tariffs in such instances is attributable to the
fact that they are sometimes lower than the avoided anti-dumping and
countervailing duties; for instance, whereas Trump has imposed a
twenty-five percent duty on steel imported into the United States, the
anti-dumping tariffs specific to China “often exceeded 200%.”181

VII. CONCLUSION
While pre-Trump administrations assessed national security under
Section 232 primarily by looking at how given imports affected national
defense, the Trump administration has elected to measure national
security under Section 232 by gauging the impact of imports on both
national defense and economic welfare. Notwithstanding this divergence,
it is inaccurate to state that Trump’s decision to increase tariffs on steel
and aluminum necessarily represents an expansion of presidential trade
powers with respect to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; Section 232
allows for consideration of variables relating to both national defense
and economic welfare in appraising national security. The broadening of
how national security is conceptualized is thus problematic not because it
risks violating domestic law, but because of how the international
community might perceive unilateral trade actions taken in the name of
eliminating that encompassed by a broader definition of ‘impairments to
national security.’ When a president claims that he is increasing duties
for purposes of addressing threats to the nation’s economic welfare,
doubts arise as to whether national security or protectionism is the true
motivator; arguably, it is considerably more difficult to differentiate
between protectionism and a state’s genuine efforts to eliminate threats
to economic welfare than it is to distinguish between protectionism and a
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country’s sincere attempts to remove impediments to effective national
defense.
Overall, because of the great costs associated with the use of Section
232 duties—namely in the form of retaliation—it is imperative that
administrations treat these tariffs not as their Plan A but as their Plan Z.

